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In April of 2004, the quarterly newslet-
ter Migration News summarized the most
recent data on race and ethnicity from
the U.S. Census Bureau: “In 2000, the
racial/ethnic makeup of US residents
was: White, 69 percent; Hispanic and
Black, 13 percent each; and Asian and
other, six percent. By 2050, these per-
centages are projected to be: 50, 24, 15,
and 13.”1For anyone who has been study-
ing racial trends in America these ½gures
weren’t surprising.1But the newsletter’s
conclusion certainly was: “It is possible
that, by 2050, today’s racial and ethnic
categories will no longer be in use.”
Migration Newsis a scholarly publica-
tion that “summarizes the most impor-
tant immigration and integration devel-
opments.”2It is produced by Migration
Dialogue, a group at the University of
California, Davis, that aspires to provide
“timely, factual and nonpartisan infor-
mation and analysis of international mi-
gration issues.” Migration Newscannot by
any stretch of the imagination be de-
scribed as fanciful or ideological–and
yet in the middle of a summary of census
data its authors produced the astonish-
ing prognosis that “by 2050, today’s ra-
cial and ethnic categories will no longer
be in use.” If Migration News is correct,
residents of the United States will, with-
in the lifetime of many readers of this
issue of Dædalus, no longer talk of
blacks, whites, Asians, Latinos, and Na-
tive Americans, but will instead speak
of–what?
Jennifer L. Hochschild
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1  This essay is part of a joint research project
with Traci Burch and Vesla Weaver, both Ph.D.
students at Harvard University. I thank them
for their contributions to our shared enterprise.
The views expressed in this essay are my own,
and not necessarily shared by these coauthors
of the larger project. 
2  <http://migration.ucdavis.edu/>.This essay explores possible answers
to that tantalizing question. By looking
backward at racial and ethnic construc-
tions and practices in the United States
over the past century, we will be better
situated to project possible racial and
ethnic constructions and practices over
the next one. Migration Newsmight well
be right–although, as I will argue, that
is a far cry from predicting that the old
shameful racial hierarchies will disap-
pear. 
T he idea of ethnicity did not exist in
1900; the term ‘ethnic’ was invented
around World War I and came into
widespread use in the 1930s. The term
‘race’ did much of the work that we now
assign to ‘ethnicity’; phrases such as ‘the
Irish race,’ ‘the Yankee race,’ and ‘the
Hebrew race’ were common and uncon-
tested. But race meant a lot more than
ethnicity. Edgar Allen Poe wrote of “the
race of Usher,” Charles Dickens, of “the
race of Evrémonde.” Biologists mea-
sured cranial capacities and developed
intelligence testing in order to make
what they perceived to be scienti½c de-
terminations of the biological differ-
ences among races of humans. In 1939
Carleton Coon, a physical anthropolo-
gist at Harvard University, published
The Races of Europe, a textbook that
named eighteen races that were spread
across the continent, including “Partial-
ly Mongoloid,” “Brunn strain, Tronder
etc., unreduced, only partly brachyce-
phalized,” “Pleistocene Mediterranean
Survivor,” “Neo-Danubian,” and so on.
Meanwhile, the Negro and Indian races
were routinely distinguished from the
white race.
A century later we retain the term
‘race,’ but only in the last of these us-
ages, that is, distinguishing a few major
groups from each other. A family is de-
scribed by ancestry, lineage, or descent–
not by race. The Irish are an ethnic
group; to identify someone as a Yankee
is to evoke a regional or cultural distinc-
tion; Jews are an amalgam of religion,
ethnicity, and perhaps culture. Anthro-
pologists no longer make racial distinc-
tions among Europeans; in fact, current
research in the ½eld of cultural studies
typically identi½es all Europeans, from
Swedes to Arabs, as a single race distin-
guished by its whiteness. 
The biology of race has also changed
dramatically. A century ago, biologists
held that there were many races, that
races could be distinguished from one
another in objective and quanti½able
ways, and that less measurable but none-
theless real differences in intelligence
and emotional maturity were closely
associated with measurable differences
in skull size or proportion of white an-
cestry. Some still held that races had dif-
ferent origins or were even different sub-
species. By the middle of the twentieth
century, however, the number of com-
monly recognized races had shrunk to a
few (in grade school, I learned about
Caucasoids, Mongoloids, Negroids, and
Indians). And by the end of the century,
conventional wisdom, at least among
scholars, held that a race was a purely
social construction with no notable bio-
logical differences. 
The wheel may be turning again, how-
ever. That well-known exemplar of post-
modern deconstructionism, the U.S.
census, is leading the way in proliferat-
ing racial identities: the census now rec-
ognizes 126 ethnoracial groups (or a
mere 63 racial groups!) and, as Kenneth
Prewitt points out, many more could
come in quick succession. At the same
time, some scientists and medical doc-
tors are contesting the view that race is
nothing but a social construction; as
Neil Risch and his coauthors put it, “a
‘race-neutral’ or ‘color-blind’ approach
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to biomedical research is neither equi-
table nor advantageous, and would not
lead to a reduction of disparities in dis-
ease risk or treatment ef½cacy between
groups.”3People of different races or
ethnicities may react differently to par-
ticular medications, may be especially
susceptible to speci½c diseases, or may
have bone marrow or kidneys compati-
ble only with some co-ethnics. Most
new biological research has been puri-
½ed of the old eugenicist motivations;
even the dean of Howard University
Medical School has endorsed a major
initiative to collect dnasamples from
his hospital’s (mostly black) patients for
medical research on diseases to which
African Americans are especially prone,
such as high blood pressure, asthma, and
prostate cancer. By 2050 the historical
seesaw between biology and social con-
structivism may be superseded by geno-
mic research that disaggregates individ-
uals at levels far below any groupings by
race, ethnicity, geography, or culture. 
In parallel with the changing meanings
of race, we have witnessed the rise and
perhaps fall of the concept of ethnicity.
That concept was invented partly in op-
position to the idea of race, since it was
taken to denote possibly malleable cul-
ture rather than biologically ½xed char-
acteristics. It was elaborated as a way to
make distinctions within a given race,
usually among whites; Michael Novak
wrote in 1972 of “the rise of the unmelt-
able ethnics” within various European
nationalities. Some analysts continue to
insist that the two terms should be de-
½ned in opposition to each other. I, like
other undergraduate lecturers, have
taught my students that Latinos have a
common ethnicity shared among multi-
ple races, whereas Paci½c Rim Asians are
a single race with multiple ethnicities. 
But scholars and activists are now
working to confound the distinction that
was developed over most of the past cen-
tury. Ian Haney López, for example,
wrote in 1997 that “conceptualizing Lati-
nos/as in racial terms is warranted. . . .
The general abandonment of racial lan-
guage and its replacement with substi-
tute vocabularies, in particular that of
ethnicity, will obfuscate key aspects of
Latino/a lives.”4Four in ten of those
who identi½ed as Hispanic or Latino on
the ethnicity question in the 2000 cen-
sus rejected all the racial categories of-
fered to them in the next question, in fa-
vor of “some other race.” Whether that
represents a principled refusal to distin-
guish race from ethnicity, or just respon-
dents’ confusion with the census form,
as the Census Bureau interpreted it, re-
mains to be seen. David Hollinger has
pointed out one of the more resonant
ironies of American racial politics: the
same federal government that separates
Hispanic ethnicity from race in the cen-
sus treats Hispanics as legally equivalent
to African Americans in antidiscrimina-
tion policies such as af½rmative action,
voting rights, and minority set-asides.
Residents of the United States began
the twentieth century by not distin-
guishing a race from an ethnicity; they
spent most of that century elaborating
the differences between the two con-
cepts; and they appear now to be col-
lapsing the distinction. The number of
recognized races shrank drastically and
is now expanding again. When the cen-
tury began, the concept of race was
tightly connected with the biological 
sciences; that bond was almost snapped
but now may be regaining strength. I am
3  Neil Risch, Esteban Burchard, Elad Ziv, and
Hua Tang, “Categorization of Humans in Bio-
medical Research: Genes, Race, and Disease,”
Genome Biology 3 (7) (2002): 1–12.
4  Ian Haney López, “Race, Ethnicity, Erasure:
The Salience of Race to LatCrit Theory,” Cali-
fornia Law Review 85 (5) (1997): 1143–1211.not making a simple cyclical argument:
the proliferation of races through multi-
ple self-de½nitions is very different from
the mapmaking of a physical anthropol-
ogist, and the biology of eugenics is un-
connected with the biology of the ge-
nome project. Nevertheless, the trans-
formations of the past century show that
Migration News’s casual suggestion that
by 2050 today’s racial and ethnic cate-
gories may no longer be in use is not as
farfetched as it initially appears to be.
De½nitions and usages of concepts
such as race and ethnicity matter be-
cause they help us to understand the
practice of racial and ethnic interaction.
If immigrants are regarded as a race
apart, biologically distinct from the rest
of us, they will be treated very different-
ly than if they are regarded as belonging
to another ethnicity, similar in crucial
ways to all the others. The structure of
racial hierarchy will be different if races
are conceived as discrete and insular
(i.e., one can be black or white but not
both) rather than if they are conceived
as occurring along a continuum. The
degree to which such conceptions and
practices have changed over the past
century can give us hints as to how they
are likely to change over the next one.
Consider immigrants ½rst. Ever alert
to its responsibility as the newspaper of
record, TheNew York Timesreminded
readers in the 1880s of “a powerful ‘dan-
gerous class,’ who care nothing for our
liberty or civilization,. . . who burrow at
the roots of society, and only come forth
in the darkness and in times of distur-
bance, to plunder and prey on the good
things which surround them, but which
they never reach.” This is, the Timespro-
ceeded to warn, “the poorest and lowest
laboring class. . . [who] drudge year after
year in fruitless labor. . . [but] never rise
above their position. . . . They hate the
rich. . . . They are densely ignorant, and
easily aroused by prejudice or passion.”
The members of this class “are mainly
Irish Catholics.”
Not only words were invoked to con-
trol the dangerous classes. Of the 1,713
lynchings in the decade after 1882 (the
½rst year for which accurate records
exist), half of the victims were white
(largely Jewish or Catholic); in the suc-
ceeding decade, a quarter were. ‘Hun-
kies,’ Italians, and Russian Jews could
live and socialize only in a ‘foreign col-
ony’ in an undesirable part of town. Un-
less there was a substantial black popula-
tion in the area, most new immigrants
occupied the lowest-skilled and lowest-
paying jobs in the lowest-status indus-
tries. When able to attain jobs that re-
quired more expertise, they were paid
less than their northern European coun-
terparts.
Eventually, however, the despised
races became the celebrated white eth-
nics. The reasons included genuine as-
similation, the desire to become white 
in order not to be black, the almost com-
plete cessation of new European immi-
gration after World War I, upward mo-
bility in a growing labor force, and polit-
ical incorporation through party ma-
chines. By the 1960s, Irish Catholic fami-
lies enjoyed on average $2,500 more than
the national average family income.5An
Irish Catholic has been president of the
nation, and during his presidential cam-
paign John Kerry was coy about the fact
that he is not Irish. Intermarriage rates
among white ethnics are so high that
demographers have largely given up try-
ing to trace socioeconomic differences
among nationalities. In short, the ethnic
boundaries at the turn of the twentieth
5  Andrew Greeley, “Ethnic Minorities in the
Unites States: Demographic Perspectives,” In-
ternational Journal of Group Tensions 7 (3 and 4)
(1977): 64–97. See table 5-C for data.
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century that were sometimes etched in
violence have mostly dissolved into
shades of whiteness. 
The transformation of the status of
Asian immigrants has been even more
phenomenal. In 1877, a U.S. Senate com-
mittee investigating Chinese immigra-
tion to California concluded that “the
Chinese do not desire to become citizens
of this country, and have no knowledge
or appreciation for our institutions. . . .
An indigestible mass in the community,
distinct in language, pagan in religion,
inferior in mental and moral qualities,
and all peculiarities, is an undesirable
element in a republic, but becomes espe-
cially so if political power is placed in its
hands.” Until the middle of the twenti-
eth century, members of most Asian na-
tionalities were prohibited from immi-
grating, becoming naturalized citizens,
or owning certain types of property.
Most Japanese Americans were in-
terned in World War II, although few
German Americans or Italian Ameri-
cans were. 
But now Asian Americans are per-
ceived, often to their chagrin, as the
‘model minority.’ Elite private universi-
ties are rumored to use informal quotas
to keep too many from beating out their
non-Asian competitors. At the most
prestigious state universities in Califor-
nia, where no such restrictions hold,
Asian American students typically ½ll
two-½fths of the student seats (in a state
whose population is 12 percent Asian
American). Almost half of adult Asian
Americans have a college degree or more
education, compared with three in ten
Anglos, two in ten African Americans,
and one in ten Latinos. A Newsweek cover
story lauds the sex appeal of Asian men;
analysts report that “Anglos living in
close proximity to large Asian popula-
tions are more likely than racially and
ethnically isolated Anglos to favor in-
creased immigration.”6As of 1990, a
½fth of the children who had one Asian
parent also had a parent of a different
race; that proportion is surely much
higher now. In the same year, 30 percent
of Asians who married wed a non-Asian
American, and that ½gure too is rising.
While discrimination persists, virulently
at times, and the label of ‘foreigner’
sometimes seems impossible to escape,
it is not crazy to think that Asians may
by 2050 have followed the path of Irish
Catholics and Polish Jews into the status
of ‘just American.’
Conversely, another group of immi-
grants–Mexican Americans, or Latinos
more generally–might become more
sharply differentiated from other resi-
dents of the United States over the next
few decades. Samuel Huntington argues
that the “extent and nature of this im-
migration differ fundamentally from
those of previous immigrations, and the
assimilation successes of the past are un-
likely to be duplicated with the contem-
porary flood of immigrants from Latin
America. This reality poses a fundamen-
tal question: Will the United States re-
main a country with a single national
language and a core Anglo-Protestant
culture?”7In this view, Latinos will fol-
low the opposite trajectory from that of
the Irish and Asians: Latinos, once per-
ceived as part of an ethnicity with an
identi½able but permeable culture, are
becoming a race with increasingly de-
½ned boundaries.
The research evidence is completely
mixed on this point. U.S.-born children
6  M. V. Hood III and Irwin Morris, “¿Amigo o
Enemigo?: Context, Attitudes, and Anglo Pub-
lic Opinion Toward Immigration,” Social Science
Quarterly 78 (2) (1997): 309–323.
7  Samuel P. Huntington, “The Hispanic Chal-
lenge,” Foreign Policy (March/April 2004):
30–45.of Mexican parents consistently receive
more education than their parents,
speak English better, earn more at high-
er-status jobs, move away from gateway
cities more frequently, marry more non-
Mexicans, and vote more. However, dis-
crimination and subordination persist,
and scholars such as Richard Alba and
his coauthors ½nd “no convincing sign
of convergence in the educational attain-
ments of later-generation Mexican
Americans and Anglos.”8That is, after
the second generation, assimilation may
lose its momentum. Sociologists even
point to the possibility of a reversal, such
that children and grandchildren of poor
immigrants may lose ground economi-
cally, disengage politically, and end up
with poorer health, higher rates of
crime, or greater family instability than
their ancestors or counterparts in their
native country.
Huntington articulates a deeper anxi-
ety: that the sheer magnitude of immi-
gration and the high birth rates among
Latinos who share a language, religion,
and background and who mostly live in
a distinct section of the United States are
creating “a de facto split between a pre-
dominantly Spanish-speaking United
States and an English-speaking United
States.” In my view, this concern is un-
warranted; the culture of the United
States is certainly changing in response
to massive immigration from Latin
America, but the immigrants are chang-
ing just as much, if not more. From the
perspective of African Americans, in
fact, the danger may be altogether too
much assimilation rather than too little 
–creating once again a society in which
immigrants get to become American by
stepping over the only group that can-
not, and does not want to, attain white-
ness (or at least nonblackness). 
Beyond the empirical complexities, I
cannot forecast whether today’s racial
and ethnic categories will no longer be
in use with regard to immigrants in2050,
because of a crucial but unpredictable
feature of immigration: the level and
composition of immigration is largely a
matter of political choice. U.S. immigra-
tion has not been drastically curtailed
after forty years of increase, as it was in
1924 after about ½fty years of a propor-
tionally similar increase. But will it be?
On the one hand, there are few signs of
an impending cutoff. So the long period
of incorporation with few newcomers
that the United States experienced from
1920 until 1965 is unlikely to be repeated
in the near future. 
On the other hand, the war against ter-
rorism may yet dramatically affect im-
migration laws and the treatment of im-
migrants. So far only a small segment of
the population has been signi½cantly
affected. But arguably precedents have
been set that could have powerful and, 
in my view, terrible consequences for the
United States’s treatment of ‘foreigners.’
And with a few more terrorist attacks,
residents of the United States could de-
velop a powerful nativism tinged with
religious and ethnic hostility and fueled
by a genuine and warranted fear. The
effect such developments would have on
the racial and ethnic categories of 2050
is anyone’s guess.
For most of the twentieth century, the
boundary between black and white was
as ½rmly ½xed in law and self-de½nition
as it was blurred in practice. This bound-
ary did not always exist; in the 1600s,
the Virginia legislature had to outlaw
interracial marriages because too many
8  Richard Alba, Dalia Abdel-Hady, Tariqul
Islam, and Karen Marotz, “Downward Assimi-
lation and Mexican Americans: An Examina-
tion of Intergenerational Advance and Stagna-
tion in Educational Attainment,” University at
Albany, suny, Albany, N.Y., 2004.
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white indentured servants were marry-
ing black proto-slaves. Interracial sexual
activity persisted, of course, and govern-
ment policy in the centuries since then
has shifted from counting mulattoes,
quadroons, and octoroons to establish-
ing “one drop of blood” laws in thirty
states by 1940. In some states or legal
jurisdictions, not only blacks but also
South Asians, Chinese and Japanese
Americans, and Mexican Americans
were forbidden to marry European
Americans. Opponents used rumors of
interracial sex to try to discredit Abra-
ham Lincoln, the Populist movement,
labor unions, New Deal agencies, deseg-
regation in the Army, and the civil rights
movement. The Supreme Court refused
to take on cases of interracial marriage
in the 1950s for fear of evoking uncon-
trollable anger; Justice Harlan is report-
ed to have said, with Thurgood Mar-
shall’s concurrence, that “one bomb-
shell at a time is enough.” 
Most of that sentiment has disap-
peared, or at least gone underground.
Multiracial identity is now a point of
public pride and private assertion; a so-
cial movement built around multiracial
identity has shown surprising strength.
In 1958, only 4 percent of whites en-
dorsed interracial marriage; the most
recent Gallup poll shows that 70 percent
now do. A recent cover of Parademaga-
zine is adorned with smiling, adorable
children under the headline of “The
Changing Faces of America”; Mattel has
introduced Kayla, whom it describes as
“Barbie’s racially ambiguous playmate”;
TheNew York Timesshowcases “Genera-
tion E.A.: Ethnically Ambiguous”; News-
weekshows yet another set of adorable
children in a story on “The New Face of
Race.” Whatever motives one attributes
to the marketing of racial complexity,
the fact that multiracialism now has
commercial appeal shows how far it has
moved from connotations of mongre-
lization and degeneration. 
How much actual multiracialism there
is in the United States is indeterminate.
The answer depends on what one de-
½nes as a race (is a marriage between a
Mexican American and a European
American interracial?), whether inter-
ethnic marriages are factored in (how
about a marriage between a Korean and
a Japanese?), how far back one goes in a
person’s ancestry to determine multira-
ciality, and what individuals know or
acknowledge in their own family histo-
ry. Nevertheless, it is probably safe to say
that intermarriage is rising, along with
the number of children who are, or who
are recognized as being, multiracial. Up
to 12 percent of youth can now readily be
called multiracial, and plausibly by 2050
about 10 percent of whites and blacks
and over 50 percent of Latinos, Asians,
and American Indians will marry out-
side their group.
Since families are comprised of more
than only parents and children, a single
intermarriage can have a wide impact.
As of 1990, “one in seven whites, one in
three blacks, four in ½ve Asians, and
more than 19 in 20 American Indians are
closely related to someone of a different
racial group. Despite an intermarriage
rate of about 1 percent, about 20 percent
of Americans count someone from a dif-
ferent racial group among their kin.”9
And those calculations include neither
marriages between or offspring of a Lati-
no and a non-Latino, nor individuals
with multiracial ancestry who consider
themselves to be members of one racial
group.
These changes in sentiment and be-
havior may grow even stronger over the
9  Joshua R. Goldstein, “Kinship Networks
that Cross Racial Lines: The Exception or the
Rule?” Demography 36 (3) (August 1999): 399–
407.next few decades, as Latinos’ celebration
of mestizaje, the mixing of races, as a cul-
tural identity and social environment,
rather than as a description of an indi-
vidual’s ancestry, spreads across the na-
tion. Similarly, the census’s invitation to
identify with more than one race may
spread, for simple bureaucratic and non-
ideological reasons, to schools, state
governments, corporations, hospitals,
the criminal justice system, the military,
and other far-reaching institutions. A
frequently repeated offer to “check one
or more” may encourage people to think
of themselves as ‘more than one.’ If the
trajectory of multiracialism persists, Mi-
gration News’s speculation that today’s
racial and ethnic categories will no lon-
ger be in use in a few decades seems even
less farfetched. 
W e cannot evaluate the impact of the
unstable meanings of race and ethnicity,
the fluctuating status of various immi-
grant groups, and the evolving connota-
tion of multiracialism without consider-
ing African Americans. They are the pe-
rennial losers in the hierarchies of sta-
tus, wealth, and power in the United
States. The boundaries around black-
ness have been the most stringently
monitored, ½rst by oppressors and now
perhaps by African Americans them-
selves; their relations with white Ameri-
cans have been and continue to be the
most fraught. If we knew how much the
meaning of being black in the United
States will change by 2050–or more
contentiously, whether racial oppression
will be signi½cantly undermined–we
would know how seriously to take the
speculationthat our current racial and
ethnic categories may become outmod-
ed.
The standing of African Americans
has changed dramatically over the past
century: Republican President Roosevelt
was widely criticized for once entertain-
ing Booker T. Washington in the White
House; Republican President Bush has
entrusted two of the most important
cabinet-level positions to African Ameri-
cans. The highest paid corporate execu-
tive on Wall Street in 2003 was black;
some African Americans hold high elec-
tive of½ce or judgeships; some are es-
teemed socially and culturally. Overall,
using criteria that encompass roughly
half of the white population, about a
third of American blacks can be de-
scribed as middle class. Affluent African
Americans can now pass their status on
to their children, so a fully developed
class structure has emerged in the black
community.
Still, perhaps a third of African Ameri-
cans remain at the bottom of the various
hierarchies in the United States. Com-
pared with all other groups, poor blacks
are more deeply poor, for longer periods
of their life and from earlier in child-
hood; they are more likely to live among
other poor people. Black children who
begin their education with roughly the
same knowledge and skills as white chil-
dren lose ground in the public school
system. Blacks are more likely to be 
victimized by crime than any other
group, and black men are much more
likely to be incarcerated and subsequent-
ly disfranchised for life than are white
men. 
More generally, we cannot dismiss the
possible persistence of what Orlando
Patterson once called the “homeostatic
principle of the entire system of racial
domination,” in which racial subordina-
tion is repressed in one location only to
burst forth in another.10Regardless of
their income, African Americans are
overcharged for used cars, less likely 
10  Orlando Patterson, “Toward a Study of
Black America,” Dissent (Fall 1989): 476–486.
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to receive appropriate treatment for
heart attacks, and less likely to receive
excellent service from realtors and
bankers. Blacks have drastically less
wealth than whites with the same earn-
ings. Whites seldom vote for black can-
didates when they have an alternative,
and even less often move into substan-
tially black neighborhoods, schools, and
churches. 
I am not sure what would count as per-
suasive evidence that the racial hierar-
chy in the United States is on a certain
path to extinction. Certainly a strong
black class structure that persists across
generations would be essential (al-
though it may merely substitute one
hierarchy for another). A sense among
African Americans that they can let
down their guard–that embracing mul-
tiracialism is not just a way of inching
closer to whiteness, that racism is only
infrequently part of the explanation for a
failure, that a commitment to racial soli-
darity need not take precedence over
values such as feminism or patriotism 
or simple idiosyncrasy–would also be
good evidence. And changed behavior
by nonblacks, such as choosing a home
or a child’s school because of its quality
rather than its racial composition, or
repudiating implicit as well as explicit
racial appeals by political candidates, 
or recognizing and disavowing the privi-
leges that come with being the apparent-
ly raceless norm in U.S. society, would
also be necessary.
Until we can be clear on what it will
take to abolish racial hierarchy in the
United States, and on how far we have
moved toward that abolition, we cannot
say whether by 2050 today’s racial and
ethnic categories will no longer be in
use. If racial hierarchy persists, so will
the categories of black and nonblack.
Multiracialism and the history of Amer-
ican racial politics over the past few de-
cades are on balance encouraging, but
they are not dispositive. 
Iturn ½nally to discrimination by skin
tone, which may be the deepest and
most tenacious form of racism in the
United States. The connection between
lightness and virtue is at least as old as
Shakespeare, whose Timon of Athens
learned too late that enough gold “will
make black white, foul fair, wrong right,
base noble, old young, coward valiant.”
Europeans have not always denigrated
dark-skinned people in favor of light-
skinned ones, as Werner Sollors shows
in An Anthology of Interracial Literature,
but by the mid-nineteenth century, few
residents of the United States publicly
contested the view that lighter was bet-
ter. Skin-color hierarchy held a fortiori
across what we now call races; northern
European whites were dominant, south-
ern Europeans and Latinos held inter-
mediate positions, and blacks were sub-
ordinated to all. But skin-color hierarchy
also obtained within racial and ethnic
groups, as phrases like ‘the black Irish’
and ‘the brown paper bag test’ and the
advertising jingle asserting that ‘blonds
have more fun’ attest.
The history of each racial or ethnic
group includes its own variant of skin-
color ranking. Spanish and Portuguese
colonizers of Latin America elaborated
rules for ranking according to a complex
mixture of race, physical appearance,
wealth, cultural heritage, and enslave-
ment: 
Whites generally have a superior status.
People of Indian racial background whose
cultural practices are mainly of Portu-
guese or Spanish derivation. . . would be
next on the social ladder. Mestizos, people
of mixed indigenous and white back-
ground, would have a higher rating than
those of largely Indian background. At thebottom of the social pyramid would be
Afro-Americans, with mulattos occupying
a higher social status than blacks.11
My research (conducted with Traci
Burch and Vesla Weaver) suggests that
skin-color ranking has had an equally
powerful impact on African Americans.
Compared with their darker-skinned
counterparts, lighter-skinned black sol-
diers in the Civil War’s Union Army
were more likely to have been skilled
workers than ½eld hands before they
entered the service. Sergeants and lieu-
tenants were most likely to be light-
skinned, and black soldiers with light
skin were more likely than their darker-
skinned counterparts to be promoted
while in the Army. They were signi½-
cantly taller (a measure of nutrition)
and–most striking of all–the lightest
members of the black regiments were
signi½cantly less likely to die in serv-
ice.12
Asian societies are not immune from
the bias of skin-color ranking. An an-
cient Japanese proverb holds that “white
skin makes up for seven defects,” and
Indian newspapers and websites carry
personal ads for women whose parents
boast of their daughters’ purity and light
skin in order to attract a husband. Euro-
pean Americans hold light skin in the
same regard, as elucidated by that noted
sociologist F. Scott Fitzgerald in This Side
of Paradise. During a conversation about
the virtues of strenuous exercise, Fitz-
gerald’s Byrne suddenly observes,
“Personal appearance has a lot to do with
it.” 
“Coloring?” Amory asked eagerly.
“Yes.”
“That’s what Tom and I ½gured,”
Amory agreed. “We took the year-books
for the last ten years and looked at the pic-
tures of the senior council. . . . It does rep-
resent success here [at Princeton Universi-
ty] in a general way. Well, I suppose only
about thirty-½ve per cent of every class
here are blonds, are really light–yet two-
thirdsof every senior council are light. . . .”
“It’s true,” Byrne agreed. “The light-
haired man is a higher type, generally
speaking. I worked the thing out with the
Presidents of the United States once, and
found that way over half of them were
light-haired, yet think of the preponder-
ant number of brunettes in the race.” 
They go on for several more paragraphs
in the same vein, apropos of nothing in
the book’s plot. 
Such examples range across several
centuries because the importance of skin
tone has changed relatively little, despite
the growth of a black cultural aesthetic,
the Latino celebration of mestizaje, and
the Asian drive for panethnic unity. Sur-
veys from the 1990s show that lighter-
skinned African Americans and Hispan-
ics continue to enjoy higher incomes and
more education than their darker coun-
terparts. They are more likely to own
homes and to live among white neigh-
bors, and less likely to be on welfare.
Darker blacks and Latinos have higher
rates of incarceration and unemploy-
ment; dark-skinned Mexican Americans
speak less English and are less likely to
be unionized if they are workers. Dark-
skinned black men convicted of a crime
receive longer sentences than lighter-
skinned counterparts. Both blacks and
whites attach more negative and fewer
positive attributes to images of dark-
skinned, compared with light-skinned,
blacks.
11  Robert J. Cottrol, “The Long Lingering
Shadow: Law, Liberalism, and Cultures of Ra-
cial Hierarchy and Identity in the Americas,”
Tulane Law Review 76 (November 2001): 11–79.
12  These data are drawn from Jacob Metzer
and Robert A. Margo, Union Army Recruits in
Black Regiments in the United States, 1862–1865,
computer ½le, University of Michigan, Inter-
university Consortium for Political and Social
Research, Ann Arbor, Mich., 1990.
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Controls for class background reduce
but do not eliminate these differences.
That is, light-skinned people are more
likely to come from a well-off family–
reflecting the historical advantages of
light skin–and they are more likely to 
be treated well by police, employers,
teachers, and other citizens. The magni-
tude of these effects is impressive. One
study found complexion to be more
closely connected than was parents’ so-
cioeconomic status to blacks’ occupa-
tion and income; another found that
“dark-skinned blacks suffer much the
same disadvantage relative to light-
skinned blacks that blacks, in general,
suffer relative to whites.”13Even if racial
and ethnic categories change drastically
by 2050, one cannot assume that skin-
color hierarchy will do the same. 
Over the past century, the meaning of
race and ethnicity has changed a lot, as
have the status of most immigrants and
the connotations of multiracialism.
Skin-color hierarchy has changed little,
and the subordination of African Ameri-
cans has been challenged but not yet
overthrown. Combining these dynamics
in various ways and with varying degrees
of emphasis permits us to envision at
least six possible futures: 
• The United States might persist in a
structure of black exceptionalism, or
an updated Jim Crow. In this scenario,
skin tone and ethnicity would matter,
but the main divide would continue to
be between those identi½ed as black
and all others. That is, race as we now
understand it would trump skin tone
and ethnicity among blacks, even if
skin tone or ethnicity complicates the
meaning of race for all other residents
of the United States. Biracial individu-
als would be treated as simply black or
nonblack, and would mostly identify
according to that binary, rather than
become a liminal or new category. 
• A similar possible scenario is white
exceptionalism. Here too, skin tone
and ethnicity would continue to mat-
ter, but the main divide would be
between those identi½ed as white and
all others. Skin tone and ethnic iden-
ti½cation would continue to matter lit-
tle among European Americans, who
would all share to a greater or lesser
degree in white privilege. Appearance
and ethnic groupings might matter a
great deal for sorting the rest of the
population, but only within a shared
subordinate status. 
• Alternatively, the United States might
move toward a South African model.
That would combine the ½rst two sce-
narios, producing a nation sorted into
three groups: whites and ‘honorary
whites’ (most Asians, some Latinos,
and some biracials), coloreds (some
Asians, most Latinos, some biracials,
and a few African Americans), and
blacks and almost-blacks (indigenous
Latinos, many Native Americans, and
some biracials, as well as African
Americans). Levels of affluence, sta-
tus, power, and vulnerability to dis-
crimination would on average vary
accordingly, with wider variations
between rather than within the
groups.14 13  Michael Hughes and Bradley R. Hertel, “The
Signi½cance of Color Remains: A Study of Life
Chances, Mate Selection, and Ethnic Con-
sciousness Among Black Americans,” Social
Forces 68 (4) (1990): 1105–1120; Verna Keith
and Cedric Herring, “Skin Tone and Strati½-
cation in the Black Community,” American Jour-
nal of Sociology 97 (3): 760–778.
14  For more on this scenario, see Eduardo
Bonilla-Silva, “We Are All Americans!: The
Latin Americanization of Race Relations in the
United States,” in Maria Krysan and Amanda
Lewis, eds., The Changing Terrain of Race and • Perhaps the United States will sort
along a more complex set of racial and
ethnic dimensions, with new under-
standings of race and ethnicity. One
possibility is sharper regional divides.
Thus the Northwest would mingle
Asians, Native Americans, and Anglos;
the Southwest would mix Latinos,
Native Americans, and Anglos; the
Midwest would remain largely Anglo;
the South would continue to hold
mostly separate populations of blacks
and Anglos, and so on. These regional
divides could develop important politi-
cal and cultural implications, even if
not at the level of the antebellum
North, South, and West as described
by Anne Norton, among others.15Or
the nation might divide along lines of
nativity, so that the most salient char-
acteristic is whether one is foreign- or
native-born. Perhaps class lines or
intensity of religious commitment or
isolationism would cut across lines of
race, ethnicity, and skin tone alike. 
• The United States might be moving
toward the eventual elimination of dis-
tinct racial and ethnic groups in favor
of a skin-color hierarchy, tout court.
Socioeconomic status, prestige, and
political power would in that case de-
pend on one’s location on that contin-
uum; identity, beliefs, and perceptions
would eventually follow. Whether such
a continuum would improve the Unit-
ed States’s racial order by substituting
fluidity for rigidity, or worsen it by 
disguising persistent racial stigma
through a series of small gradations,
remains to be seen. 
• Finally, the United States might blur
distinct racial and ethnic groups into a
multiracial mélange. The logic of mul-
tiracialism differs from that of skin
color since the former is not inherently
hierarchical: black/white individuals
have the same standing qua ‘multira-
cials’ as do Asian/Latino individuals.
The crucial divide in this scenario
would be between those who identify
as monoracials and seek to protect cul-
tural purity and those who identify 
as multiracials and celebrate cultural
mixing. Skin tone, along with conven-
tional distinctions of race and ethnici-
ty, would recede in importance.
Prediction is a fool’s game. The future
will be partly controlled by political and
policy choices not yet made, perhaps not
yet even imagined. Furthermore, as
others discuss in detail in this issue of
Dædalus, the very categories that we em-
ploy to measure racial and ethnic change
will themselves affect the direction and
magnitude of that change. The census is
not a neutral bean counter; Heisenberg’s
principle holds for the social as well as
the physical world. Nevertheless, I will
venture a guess: skin tone will continue
to be associated with invidious distinc-
tions; African Americans will remain a
distinct although not always subordinat-
ed social grouping; and everything else
in this arena–our understandings of
race and ethnicity, our treatment of im-
migrants, our evaluation of people and
cultures that cut across formerly distinct
categories–is up for grabs. 
Ethnicity (New York: Russell Sage Foundation,
2004): 149–183.
15  Anne Norton, Alternative Americas: A Read-
ing of Antebellum Political Culture (Chicago, Ill.:
University of Chicago Press, 1986).
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